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Abstract 
Fundamental changes in the institutional arrangements for aviation regulation in Europe, the introduction of 
new technologies and operations, and demands for higher levels of safety performance call for the adaptation 
of existing certification processes. The European Commission (EC) Project ‘Aviation Safety and Certification of 
new Operations and Systems’ (ASCOS) contributes to removal of certification obstacles and supports 
implementation of technologies. A key step in an improved certification process is a framework for Safety 
Performance Indicators (SPIs) in the total aviation system. The main objective of this study is to develop Safety 
Performance Indicators for the system of organizations in aviation, and relate these to the main operational 
issues identified in the European Aviation Safety plan (EASp), established by EASA. Specific research objectives: 
• To identify and summarize key European activities on Safety Performance Indicators; 
• To provide a concise theoretical overview of safety performance; 
• To develop a list of characteristics (criteria) of a good measure of safety performance; 
• To develop and select safety performance indicators for the system of organizations in aviation; 
• To relate the safety performance indicators to the main operational issues identified in the EASp; 
• To provide guidance on the quantification of selected safety performance indicators. 
 
There is a need to develop safety performance indicators for the total aviation system. Such safety 
performance indicators should meet quality criteria to assure they are quantifiable, representative to safety 
performance, comprehendible and can be cost-efficiently used. Developed safety performance indicators 
should be related to the main operational safety issues as identified by EASA and EC in the European Aviation 
Safety plan (EASp). This paper focuses on the development of safety performance indicators for the class 
‘system of organizations’, which will form a part of a single framework for the total aviation system.  
Both lagging (measuring past outcomes or events) and leading (measuring safety before any event in the 
actual operation needs to take place) safety performance indicators are drafted for (1) the safety performance 
at interfaces between organisations, (2) the level of interaction, openness and sharing of information between 
different stakeholders, (3) the safety performance of an air transport system throughout its lifecycle, and (4) 
the level of harmonization in the approach to safety performance management activities at different 
organisations. 
The suggested lagging safety performance indicators match the quality criteria. For leading indicators it needs 
to be validated that they are representative as measurement for accident risk, although it can be assumed 
there is a positive relation between a correct functioning system of organisation and aviation safety. Effort is 
required to validate that positive relation. A baseline risk picture can be obtained by expanding the safety 
performance indicators into a causal risk model that formally represents the causal and statistical associations 
between the safety performance indicators and accident probabilities for various accident scenarios. The 
system of safety performance indicators and the causal risk model only provide a snapshot view of safety. In 
order to be useful in support of continued operational safety there must also be a process for continuous 
safety monitoring.  
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 Introduction 1
1.1 Background and scope 
Certification risk has been cited as an obstacle for the introduction of many innovative technologies and 
operational concepts. Fundamental changes in the institutional arrangements for aviation regulation in 
Europe, the introduction of new technologies and operations, and demands for higher levels of safety 
performance call for the adaptation of existing certification processes. The European Commission (EC) Project 
‘Aviation Safety and Certification of new Operations and Systems’ (ASCOS) contributes to the removal of 
certification obstacles and supports implementation of technologies to reach the EU ACARE Vision 2020 [1] 
and Flight Path 2050 [2] goals. ASCOS outlines an approach to certification that [3, 4]: 
• Is more flexible with regard to the introduction of new operations, systems and products; 
• Is more efficient, in terms of cost, time and safety, than the current certification processes; 
• Considers the impact on safety of all elements of the total aviation system and the entire system life-cycle 
in a complete and integrated way. 
  
Moving towards performance based regulation, based upon agreed safety performance in combination with 
risk based approach to standardization, is expected to lead to improvements in the way that safety risks are 
controlled [4]. Anticipating on future risks and hazards by using a "proactive approach" helps to make the 
certification process robust to new developments. Introducing ‘continuous safety monitoring’ will ensure that 
new and essential safety data is effectively used immediately after it will be available. Promising options for 
adaptations of the existing certification processes include [4]: ‘change between performance-based and 
compliance-based or vice versa’, ‘proof of concept approach’, ‘enforce existing rules and improve existing 
processes’, and ‘cross-domain fertilization’. Introducing certification process adaptations cannot be done 
without giving due account to safety considerations: each of these options requires evidence on safety 
assurance as key element in a certification process. In this respect, it is relevant to note that the need for 
safety improvement is also recognized in the ACARE Beyond Vision 2020 (Towards 2050) [5], which states that 
‘society is increasingly reluctant to accept failures in the Air Transport System, which exerts more pressure on 
safety considerations’. The Flightpath 2050 Vision for Aviation [2] specifically aims for a holistic, total system 
approach to aviation safety, integrated across all components and stakeholders. This will be supported by new 
safety management, safety assurance and certification techniques that account for all system developments. 
Just culture will be adopted as essential element of the safety process [2]. Clearly, there is a need for new 
safety based design systems and supporting tools that address the total aviation system, while being able to 
anticipate on future and emerging risks that may exist in a future aviation system that will differ from today’s 
aviation system. Although a total aviation system approach is becoming more widely supported in aviation, 
there is still a lot to be done before this will actually be embedded in certification processes and safety 
management. Safety topics that require further research – in particular from a total aviation system point of 
view – are e.g. development of a framework of Safety Performance Indicators (SPI) [6], establishment of a 
baseline risk picture and safety performance targets [7], definition of a process for continuous safety 
monitoring, development of risk models and accident scenarios representing the future aviation system, and 
subsequent incorporation of the – total aviation system – safety methods and tools in safety standards.  
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1.2 Needs 
Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material for the implementation and measurement of Safety 
Key Performance Indicators (SKPIs) in the ATM domain have been developed by EASA. However, in the context 
of developing a new methodology and supporting tools for multi-stakeholder continuous safety monitoring, 
there is a need to define a framework of safety performance indicators for the total aviation system. Such 
safety performance indicators should meet quality criteria to assure they are quantifiable, representative to 
safety performance, comprehendible and can be cost-efficiently used. Developed safety performance 
indicators should be related to the main operational safety issues as identified by EASA and EC in the European 
Aviation Safety plan (EASp) [8]. 
1.3 Objectives 
The main objective of this study is to develop Safety Performance Indicators for the system of organizations in 
aviation, and relate these to the main operational issues identified in the European Aviation Safety plan, 
established by EASA. This will be realized through specific research objectives: 
• To identify and summarize key European activities on Safety Performance Indicators; 
• To provide a concise theoretical overview of safety performance; 
• To develop a list of characteristics (criteria) of a good measure of safety performance; 
• To develop and select safety performance indicators for the system of organizations in aviation; 
• To relate the safety performance indicators to the main operational issues identified in the EASp; 
• To provide guidance on the quantification of selected safety performance indicators. 
1.4 Research approach 
Firstly, the key European activities on Safety Performance Indicators are identified and described. This includes 
the applicable European Commission regulations and already existing Acceptable Means of Compliance and 
Guidance Material. Next, the research starts with a concise theoretical overview of safety performance 
indicators. In ASCOS this is used to systematically identify several classes of safety performance indicators, 
resulting in a complete (covering the whole aviation system) and balanced (in the sense that all indicators are 
of a similar level of detail) list of safety performance indicators. It is argued that safety performance indicators 
will be defined at four levels/classes: technology, human, organization, and system organizations. While the 
framework will cover the total aviation system, the emphasis will be on the main operational issues as defined 
in the European Aviation Safety Plan: runway excursions, mid-air collisions, controlled flight into terrain, loss of 
control in flight, runway incursions, and fire, smoke and fumes. This ensures alignment with the safety 
strategies of the European Commission and EASA. This paper focuses on the development of safety 
performance indicators for the class ‘system of organizations’, which will form a part of a single framework for 
the total aviation system. What is considered important to measure will be compared with what is possible 
given current data. A gap analysis will show what data needs to be gathered to ensure that safety can really be 
monitored effectively. This will allow the further development and validation of a continuous monitoring 
process.  
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 Current European playing field 2
The Single European Sky (SES) Performance Scheme aims at setting and implementing binding targets for 
Member States to deliver better air navigation services at lower costs. The SES Performance Scheme covers 
four performance areas: costs efficiency, safety, capacity and environmental impact. For the period 2012-2014 
(Reference Period 1), European Union-wide targets have been set for all except safety. Regarding safety, the 
scheme aims to ensure that safety levels remain at least at the levels required by the EASA-defined rules and 
regulations which are monitored by the EC assisted by the Performance Review Body. Introduction of safety 
management systems in aviation has resulted in EC requirement to measure safety performance through use 
of safety performance indicators [9, 10, 11, 12]. 
 
The safety Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and performance targets must be established and implemented 
in line with the safety objectives and standards laid down in Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 [9]. Specific and 
measurable key performance indicators should be selected, on the basis of which responsibility for achieving 
the performance targets can be assigned. The associated targets should be achievable, realistic and time-
bound, and aim at effectively steering the sustainable performance of air navigation services [12]. This includes 
the following safety KPIs under the EC performance regulation: 
• Effectiveness of Safety Management and Just Culture 
• Methodology for severity classification of reported safety-related occurrences. 
 
SPIs are being developed for implementation as from 2015 and are priority for Reference Period 2 (2015 – 
2019). In this second Reference Period, Member States will also be expected to deliver in respect to a future 
safety target defined for air navigation services. In this context, it is relevant to note that EC Regulations No 
691/2010 [10] and No 1216/2011 [11] should be repealed with effect of 1 January 2015. 
 
EASA Member States are now developing and using SPIs as part of their State Safety Programmes (SSPs). In 
support of this, EASA has developed Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) for 
measuring the safety Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and Performance indicators (PIs) in accordance with 
the performance scheme Regulation (EC Regulation No 691/2010 [10] as amended by No 1216/2011 [11] for 
period 2012 – 2014 and EC Regulation No 390/2013 [12] for period 2015 – 2019) [13, 14]. 
 
EUROCONTROL also provides supporting material. The EUROCONTROL ATM safety framework maturity survey 
is a self-assessment questionnaire that addresses nine key elements of safety management. The 
questionnaires have a graded scale of responses that correspond to five levels of safety maturity. The scoring 
system takes account of the fact that various questions have different levels of significance through the 
application of weighting factors [15, 16]. The EUROCONTROL severity classification of RAT is a method for 
quantifying the overall severity of one occurrence from the risk of collision/proximity (separation and rate of 
closure) and the degree of controllability over the incident [17]. There are assessment procedures for five 
different types of occurrences: more than one aircraft involved, aircraft – aircraft tower, aircraft with ground 
movement, only one aircraft involved, and ATM specific occurrences. The assessment is based on a question-
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based scoring mechanism. The level of presence and corresponding level of absence of just culture can be 
measured through a questionnaire. In this context, just culture is defined as “a culture in which front line 
operators or others are not punished for actions, omissions or decisions taken by them that are commensurate 
with their experience and training, but where gross negligence, wilful violations and destructive acts are not 
tolerated”.  
 
Within SESAR, a catalogue of safety indicators that are used or could be used in ATM was developed in the 
context of the development of the SESAR Accident Incident Model (AIM) [18]. This provides an interesting 
reference because the link between indicators and a risk model is similar to what is being proposed in ASCOS. 
Definitions of lagging and leading indicator currently used within the European ATM community are clarified. A 
classification of lagging and leading indicators is proposed that allows them to be assigned to the individual 
Accident Incident Models, as is currently used in the SESAR JU Project. 
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 Safety performance indicators state-of-the-art 3
3.1 Safety performance measurement history 
Measuring safety performance has been studied for at least 50 years [19]. Traditionally, accident rates were 
used to measure the performance of aviation safety. When safety increased, accidents became rare events 
and alternative ways to derive safety performance were required. 
  
Safety is the freedom of unacceptable risk, were risk is a combination of the probability of occurrence of harm 
and the severity of the harm [20]. Harm is physical injury or damage to the health of people either directly or 
indirectly as a result of damage to property or the environment. Safety has a probabilistic aspect, and this is 
one of the reasons why it is a difficult subject to measure, since absence of harm does not necessarily indicate 
the absence of risk.  
 
In case of aviation safety, the severity of the harm is described by ICAO’s definition of an accident as an 
occurrence resulting in fatalities, serious injuries or severe damage to the aircraft [21]. Using this definition, 
aviation safety can be described as the absence of an unacceptable accident probability, and safety 
performance can be described as the accident probability that is achieved in relation to the accident 
probability that is considered acceptable. Therefore, aviation safety performance indicators should provide an 
indication of the probability of an accident. 
3.2 Criteria for proper safety performance indicators 
To be able to judge the suitability of an indicator or a set of indicators preferable characteristics have to be 
defined. In general it is already stated that aviation safety performance indicators should provide an indication 
of the probability of an accident. That means they have to be quantifiable and that there needs to be a relation 
with accident probability. Rockwell [22] identified the following criteria for a good measure of safety 
performance: 
• Quantifiable and permitting statistical inferential procedures. An indicator is quantifiable if it is 
capable of being counted or measured. While counting occurrences may seem a simple activity, it 
requires a careful definition of the indicator such that it is unambiguous whether an occurrence 
should be counted or not. Without a proper definition there is the possibility that the same 
occurrence is interpreted differently by different analysts. 
• Valid or representative to what is to be measured. In the end one needs to measure accident risk; 
the likelihood of the occurrence of an event with such a severity that it is an accident. Therefore there 
should be an association between the indicator and accident risk. An association does not necessarily 
mean that the indicator and accident risk are causally related. 
• Provide minimum variability when measuring the same conditions. Any measuring device should 
read the same value under equal conditions. 
• Sensitive to change in environmental or behavioural conditions. Sensitivity of an indicator is needed 
to assure changes in environmental and behavioural conditions can indeed be observed with the use 
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of the indicator. Sensitivity is important for indicators that involve judgement or interpretation, for 
instance indicators that are self-assessments; does the assessment indeed give different results if 
conditions have changed. 
• Cost of obtaining and using measures is consistent with the benefits. The benefits of safety 
performance indicators are difficult to quantify by any means, and estimating the benefit for each 
indicator individually is virtually impossible. Therefore in practice this criterion means that the costs 
for obtaining and using the indicators should be acceptably low. 
• Comprehended by those in charge with the responsibility of using them. As a general rule, the 
higher up in the chain of command, the less specialist knowledge is available. Therefore indicators 
that are being used by safety specialists should be different from those used by a general manager. 
 
These characteristics must be valid for each indicator. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) adds a 
characteristic that must be matched by the set of indicators [23]: 
• The total set of indicators should remain manageable. The set of safety performance indicators 
should not contain too many indicators rendering the management impracticable. The practical 
number of indicators depends on the size of the aviation system of the state and the funds available 
for state safety management.  
3.3 The total aviation system 
To ascertain a set of safety performance indicators represents the total aviation system a systematic approach 
is needed. Reason [24] describes an accident as a situation in which latent failures combine adversely with 
local trigger events (weather, location etc.) and with active failures of individuals at the operational level. 
Latent failures are failures that are created a long time before the accident, but lie dormant until an active 
failure triggers their operation. Their defining feature is that they were present within the system well before 
the onset of an accident sequence. According to Reason, the layers of defence that have been set up to 
prevent accidents are not perfect. This concept is often graphically illustrated as slices of holed cheese, each 
slice representing a barrier at a different organisational level. The holes in the cheese are barrier failures and 
an accident occurs when the holes line up. Since the holes determine the likelihood of an accident they can be 
considered as indicators of safety performance.  
 
The term ‘barrier’ to describe a strategy for risk prevention is often linked to work by Haddon [25]. He 
described that there are several different types of risk prevention strategies, and that they should be 
systematically analysed in order to minimise risk. The term safety barrier is often used as a collective term for 
different means to realize the concept-in-depth. No common definition of safety barriers exists, but the 
following definition captures the concept well: Safety barriers are physical and/or non-physical means planned 
to prevent, control or mitigate undesired events or accidents [26]. 
 
A slight variation of the physical/non-physical categorization is the distinction between human, technology and 
organizational systems. The term “MTO” (Man-Technology-Organisation) was introduced in Sweden with the 
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intention to stimulate a comprehensive view on nuclear safety [27]. Because aviation is a more distributed 
system than a nuclear powerplant and has more (types of) stakeholders, the class ‘system of organizations’ is 
added to cater for those barriers that exist on the interfaces between organizations. This paper focuses on 
safety performance indicators to measure the proper functioning of the system of organizations.  
3.4 Leading and lagging indicators 
The ICAO Safety Management Manual (SMM) [28] defines three methodologies for identifying hazards. For 
each methodology safety performance indicators can be defined resulting in different types of indicators. The 
three methodologies are: 
a) Reactive. This methodology involves analysis of past outcomes or events. Hazards are identified 
through investigation of safety occurrences. Incidents and accidents are clear indicators of system 
deficiencies and therefore can be used to determine the hazards that either contributed to the event 
or are latent. 
b) Proactive. This methodology involves analysis of existing or real-time situations, which is the primary 
job of the safety assurance function with its audits, evaluations, employee reporting, and associated 
analysis and assessment processes. This involves actively seeking hazards in the existing processes. 
c) Predictive. This methodology involves data gathering in order to identify possible negative future 
outcomes or events, analysing system processes and the environment to identify potential future 
hazards and initiating mitigating actions. 
 
Indicators associated to reactive processes are often called lagging indicators. In some documentation (e.g. 
[29]) precursor indicators are used as additional indicator type. These indicators measure events that are 
precursors to major accidents, e.g. unstable approaches, level busts, and engine shut-downs. The breakdown 
into lagging indicators and precursor indicator is not deemed useful since both measure past events during 
flight. Furthermore, using such a breakdown implies that true leading indicators measure only accidents. In the 
current extremely safe air transport system such indicators are not a meaningful measure of safety 
performance.  
 
Both proactive and predictive processes can be measured using leading indicators. They are leading in the 
sense that they measure safety before any event in the actual operation needs to take place. This makes them 
a very useful tool for safety improvement, because mitigating measures can be realized before any harm takes 
place. This could potentially result in a significant improvement of safety, i.e. a significant reduction of the 
probability of an accident. Lagging indicators are mostly very straightforward and widely used. Leading 
indicators are relatively new. To fully use the potential of leading indicators research is required to establish 
the relation between the indicator and accident risk. 
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 Safety performance indicators for system of organisations 4
4.1 The system of organisations 
The aviation system can be considered as a system of organisations in the sense that several different 
organisations cooperate to achieve an overall objective that none of the individual organisations can reach by 
itself. The individual organisations constituting a system of organisations can be very different and operate 
semi-independently, yet their interactions are essential for the performance of the total system.  
The number of stakeholders involved in or affected by a change in air transport operations is very large. Figure 
1 gives an overview of groups of stakeholders, with a few example stakeholders per group indicated [30]. 
Safety performance indicators can be considered from the perspective of how well the individual organisations 
interact. This requires identification of the individual systems and their interfaces and interactions. To measure 
the correct functioning of a system of organisations, one needs to define when a system of organisations is 
functioning correctly. It is assumed that a correctly functioning system of organisations contributes to an 
overall acceptable safety performance. A system of organisations functions properly: 
• When there is no performance decrease at interfaces between organisations;  
• When there is proven interaction, openness and sharing of information between different 
stakeholders;  
• When during the entire lifecycle of an air transport system the system functions as designed, and;  
• When there is a harmonized approach to safety performance management activities at different 
organisations. 
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Figure 1: stakeholders in the air transport system 
      
    
Ref: Safety Performance Indicators in Aviation Page: 15 
Issue: 1.0 Classification: Public 
 
ASCOS — Aviation Safety and Certification of new Operations and Systems Grant Agreement No. 314299
 
 
4.2 Definition and selection of safety performance indicators 
In ASCOS [6] various safety performance indicators are defined per element for a properly functioning system 
of organisations. These indicators are scored against the six criteria for good safety performance 
measurement. The following scoring categories are used: 
• The criterion is easily matched 
• It will cost effort (for example research) to match the criterion 
• The criterion cannot be matched by the indicator 
 
A final set of safety performance indicators is selected from the initial set based on the score. The indicators 
that are selected are those that: 
• At least match 2 of the 6 criteria easily, and; 
• Can in theory match every criterion (i.e. if effort is invested into the development). 
 
In the following sections the final set of safety performance indicators is introduced. It will be discussed what 
kind of effort is still required to assure the indicator matches all six criteria. If for a specific indicator a criterion 
is not discussed it can be assumed that that criterion is easily matched. 
 
Per element a list of indicators is given including a rationale behind the indicators. It is also indicated which 
EASp operational issue (OI) can be associated with the safety performance indicator. The OIs are: 
• Runway excursion (RE) 
• Mid-air collision (MAC) 
• Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) 
• Loss of control in flight (LOC-I) 
• Runway incursions (RI) 
• Fire, smoke and fumes (F-NI) 
 
For some indicators multiple OI are applicable. To assure applicability of only one OI such indicator can be 
further detailed using for example the specific flight phase for which the indicator is used. So if an indicator 
can be associated to both runway excursions and loss of control in flight the indicator can be split up in those 
applicable to take-offs and landing and those applicable to en-route. Some indicators capture an aggregate 
level of safety performance, for those indicators all operational issues are valid. 
 
In Europe acceptable means of compliance and guidance material are drafted for the implementation and 
measurement of safety Key Performance Indicators [13, 14]. It is noted that it is not yet determined if the SPI 
introduced below comply with the European guidance material. It is recommended to do so.   
4.2.1 Safety performance indicators for the interfaces 
A system of organisations can only function if there are links between the individual organisations. Operational 
hazards may originate from an organisation’s own line of business, but may also originate at the interfaces of 
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these organisations. Hazards that originate from the interfaces between different organisations are 
particularly important because of the risk that nobody feels responsible for mitigating them. Table 1 lists safety 
performance indicators for measuring safety performance at the interfaces between organisations. 
 
Table 1: Safety performance indicators for interfaces between organisations 
Name of indicator Rationale EASp OIs 
System combined runway incursion 
rate 
Runway incursions involve the interface of the operation 
of aerodromes, aircraft operators and air traffic 
management. 
RI 
System combined airprox rate Airproxes involve the interface of the operation of aircraft 
operators and air traffic management. 
MAC 
Operator combined erroneous 
weather prediction rate 
Erroneous weather predictions can affect an aerodrome, 
ANSP and aircraft operator, but are the responsibility of 
meteorological services. 
RE, LOC-I 
System combined bird strike rate Bird strikes involve the interface of operations of 
aerodromes, aircraft operators and air traffic 
management. 
RE, LOC-I 
Effort required to match criteria 
All indicators that measure the safety performance at the interfaces between organisations easily match the 
criteria. The suggested safety performance indicators are straightforward lagging indicators.  It is 
recommended to properly define what is meant with an erroneous prediction of weather.  
4.2.2 Safety performance indicators for interactions 
Besides the measurement of safety performance using lagging indicators, one can also measure the 
interactions between organisations with leading indicators for a more proactive approach. The importance of 
proper interaction between aviation stakeholders is long known, which is for example demonstrated by a 1965 
accident report (BAC 1-11 deep stall accident in 1963) which concluded that knowledge gained from incidents 
and accidents may not always be made known among the industry owing to the lack of effective formal or 
standing arrangements, and that a more regular basis for the exchange of experience among aircraft 
constructors and research establishments on new problems affecting safety encountered during aircraft 
development would have considerable value [31]. Table 2 lists safety performance indicators for measuring 
the interaction between organisations. 
 
Table 2: Safety performance indicators for measuring the interaction between organisations 
Name of indicator Rationale EASp OIs 
Total number of formal safety 
related meetings involving at least 
two different types of organisations 
(e.g. an aerodrome and ANSP) per 
year 
This indicator counts the number of specific inter-
organisational meetings. This includes meetings between 
operators and their most used aerodromes, between the 
operator and the ANSP at their home base, etc. 
All 
Total number of formal meetings of 
network of analysts to discuss safety 
performance measurement 
A Network of Analysts (NoA) can facilitate the 
development and continuing improvement of 
harmonized safety performance indicators used by 
All 
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industry (e.g. airlines, ATC, aerodromes etc.). A network 
can review the quality and consistency of data, establish 
the necessary data streams, investigate new safety 
indicators, monitor the emergence of new safety-critical 
areas, share experiences and coordinate analyses of 
common interest across the industry. A NoA can also 
carry out analysis of safety data to support safety action 
plans, as well as identifying emerging issues for possible 
inclusion in the future. A NoA should meet regularly (say 
at least 4 times a year).  
Effort required to match criteria 
The two indicators suggested for interactions are clearly easily quantifiable and comprehendible. It is difficult 
however to validate that it is representative as measurement for accident risk. There should be an association 
between the indicator and accident risk. An association does not necessarily mean that the indicator and 
accident risk are causally related. It is however difficult to determine the exact association between the correct 
functioning of the system of organisations (i.e. in this case the interaction between stakeholders) and accident 
risk. It is not unreasonable to assume there is a positive relation between a correct functioning system of 
organisation and aviation safety. Effort is required to validate that positive relation. 
4.2.3 Safety performance indicators for lifecycle 
An important notion of a system of organisations is that it spans a lifecycle of many years; starting from 
research at universities and research organisations, followed by the development of aircraft by design 
organisations, resulting in the actual operation of the aircraft by one operator or multiple operators. During 
the many years of operation maintenance, repair and overhaul organisations play an important role to keep 
the aircraft airworthy. During the lifecycle of an aircraft a lot of lessons are learnt. These lessons need to be 
disseminated, also to those organisations that are involved in the development of next generation systems 
with their own lifecycle. Table 3 lists the safety performance indicators for the measurement of the proper and 
continuous safety performance over specific lifecycles.  
 
Table 3: Safety performance indicators for measurement continuing safety performance over a lifecycle 
Name of indicator Rationale EASp OIs 
The safety impact of each significant 
airport infrastructural change is 
assessed and deemed acceptable 
before the actual introduction of the 
change 
Indicator to monitor if the safety impacts of (technical) 
infrastructural changes to airports are assessed (e.g. 
taxiway layout, new holding points etc.) to assure safe 
operation of the airport throughout its lifecycle and to 
disseminate lessons learnt. 
RE, RI 
The actual safety impact of each 
significant airport infrastructural 
change is evaluated at most after 3 
years of implementation of the 
change 
Indicator to assure that it is evaluated if initial safety 
impact assessments were appropriate. This evaluation 
can result in lessons-learnt to assure continuous 
improvement of safety assessments throughout the 
lifecycle.  
RE, RI 
The safety impact of each significant 
aircraft modification is assessed and 
deemed acceptable before the 
Indicator to assess the impact of design changes of 
existing aircraft (modifications, new engines, retrofits) on 
operator safety performance to assure safe operation of 
All 
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actual introduction of the 
modification 
the aircraft throughout its lifecycle and to disseminate 
lessons learnt. 
The actual safety impact of each 
significant aircraft modification is 
evaluated at most after 3 years of 
implementation of the modification 
Indicator to assure that it is evaluated if initial safety 
impact assessments were appropriate. This evaluation 
can result in lessons-learnt to assure continuous 
improvement of safety assessments throughout the 
lifecycle. 
All 
The safety impact of each significant 
ATM provision modification is 
assessed and deemed acceptable 
before the actual introduction of the 
modification 
Indicator to monitor the safety impact of changes to ATM 
(e.g. new radar, new software) to assure safe operation 
of ATM throughout the lifecycle and to disseminate 
lessons learnt. 
MAC, 
CFIT, RI 
The actual safety impact of each 
significant ATM provision 
modification is evaluated at most 
after 3 years of implementation of 
the modification 
Indicator to assure that it is evaluated if initial safety 
impact assessments were appropriate. This evaluation 
can result in lessons-learnt to assure continuous 
improvement of safety assessments throughout the 
lifecycle. 
MAC, 
CFIT, RI 
The safety impact of an aircraft 
flying under an outdated 
certification scheme is assessed 
after each significant change in 
certification rules 
Indictor to measure the safety impact of aircraft that are 
operated using an out-dated certification regime 
(grandfather rights) to assure safe operation of the 
aircraft throughout is lifecycle and to disseminate lessons 
learnt. 
All 
A proper means to identify future 
risks is set-up and altered when 
deemed necessary 
Indicator to measure if an appropriate method to identify 
future emerging risks is set-up to assure proper safety 
performance proactively.  
All 
Future risk are identified on a 
regular basis (at least each year new 
risks should be identified) using a 
dedicated means to do so 
Indicator to measure if future risks are identified on a 
regular basis to assure the proper and continuous safety 
performance. 
All 
Effort required to match criteria 
Most selected indicators under the category lifecycle depend on the realization of safety assessments. It is 
believed that the experience in the execution of safety assessments is mature enough in the aviation industry 
to base indicators on. The indicators suggested here are Boolean; they are either true of false, this makes 
quantification straightforward and makes them comprehendible and cost-efficient. Most efforts will be 
required not in using the indicators but in developing the proper techniques to assess and evaluate changes, 
and to identify future risks.  
4.2.4 Safety performance indicators for harmonization 
ICAO Annex 19 [0] provisions are intended to harmonize the implementation of safety management practices 
for states and organisations involved in aviation activities.   
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Table 4 list safety performance indicators to measure the level of harmonization of the system of 
organisations.  
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Table 4: Safety performance indicators to measure the level of harmonization of the system of organisations 
Name of indicator Rationale EASp OIs 
A common risk classification 
framework is used by CAAs and 
industry (using the same criteria for 
likelihood and severity of events) 
To ensure risks of different organisations can be 
compared a common risk classification framework should 
be used. A risk classification framework consists of 
categories of severity and likelihood of hazards. 
All 
The number of organisations that 
have fully implemented a Safety 
Management System (SMS) before 
the final transitional dates allowed. 
Since an SMS is meant to harmonize safety management, 
the number of organisations that have implemented an 
SMS can be used as an indicator. 
  
All 
The average level of regulatory 
compliance of states (for example 
using ICAO USOAP CMA
1
 or EASA 
audits) should be measured every 
three years and should increase 
every three years  
As a measure of overarching harmonization between 
states the average level of regulatory compliance with EU 
regulations and ICAO provisions can be monitored. 
All 
 
Effort required to match criteria 
It will require effort to validate the positive relation between a harmonized system and the avoidance of 
accidents, and to determine proper measurements to quantify issues such as regulatory requirement. To 
assure sensitivity to changes in harmonization levels measurement must be done frequently increasing costs of 
obtaining the results; a proper balance needs to be found. The indicator measuring the number of 
organisations that have fully implemented a Safety Management System is only valid op until the final 
transitional date.   
4.3 Quantification 
The indicators used to measure the functioning of interfaces between organizations are mostly based on 
safety occurrences (e.g. accidents, serious incidents, occurrences etc.). Simply counting the number of safety 
occurrences is normally not a correct way to measure aviation safety. The occurrence data need to be 
normalised by their exposure to the risk of flying. There are several ways in which occurrence data can be 
normalised. Examples of typical normalisation data are total number of kilometres flown, flights hours, airport 
movements, passenger kilometres and number of flights conducted. Safety indicators based on kilometres 
flown, flight hours and other equivalent denominators are not necessarily the most appropriate as most 
aviation safety occurrences take place during take-off, initial climb, approach, and landing flight phases. The 
time spent or the distance flown in these phases are independent of the total flight duration or distance 
travelled between two airports. Changes in the average trip duration or average distance flown can therefore 
influence the calculated safety performance when using these data to normalise occurrences. Therefore the 
number of flights is considered to be the most appropriate for normalisation of lagging indicators. 
Quantification of a particular safety performance indicator then requires counting the number of occurrences 
                                                                
1
 universal safety oversight audit programme continuous monitoring approach 
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of the event described by the indicator as well as the associated number of flights. Data availability is therefore 
obviously an important issue. 
 
For leading safety performance indicators there is no common recipe for normalisation and for some of the 
indicators suggested in this paper normalisation is very straightforward, e.g. counting meetings per year and 
assuring safety assessments are done per opportunity to do so. Clearly, the proper normalisation should be 
determined case by case, taking into account the intended scope and use of the safety performance scheme of 
which the indicators are a part. 
  
      
    
Ref: Safety Performance Indicators in Aviation Page: 22 
Issue: 1.0 Classification: Public 
 
ASCOS — Aviation Safety and Certification of new Operations and Systems Grant Agreement No. 314299
 
 
 ASCOS perspective 5
Within ASCOS, the development of a framework of safety performance indicators is not an isolated effort but 
is interconnected with the development of a baseline risk picture for aviation, a process for safety 
performance monitoring and the development of associated tools. 
 
Significant improvement of safety can only be realised if the priorities are focused on areas that provide the 
highest contribution to risk. It is imperative that States and organisations remain focused on their safety 
priorities. Therefore, specific activities in ASCOS are aimed at developing a capability to perform a risk 
evaluation of the total aviation system and the identification of safety priorities through the creation of a 
baseline risk picture for Europe.  
 
The baseline risk picture is obtained by expanding the safety performance indicators into a causal risk model 
that formally represents the causal and statistical associations between the safety performance indicators and 
accident probabilities for various accident scenarios. The model can then be used to estimate the accident 
probability based on the safety performance indicator values, thereby providing a baseline risk picture. Safety 
priorities can be established by considering the contribution of the various accident scenarios to the baseline 
risk picture.  
 
The system of safety performance indicators and the causal risk model only provide a snapshot view of safety. 
In order to be useful in support of continued operational safety there must also be a process for continuous 
safety monitoring. By using data that is continuously gathered through flight data monitoring and occurrence 
reporting to feed the safety performance indicators and subsequently the causal risk model, the risk picture is 
constantly updated and safety priorities can be reallocated if required.  
 
Currently the tools to collect and process data for continuous safety monitoring are not yet fully developed. 
Software for flight data monitoring is available and extensively being used by the airlines, but the capabilities 
to integrate information from various sources is limited and in Europe there is not yet a system in place like 
the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) in the US that collects, stores and analysis raw 
flight data for the purpose of flight safety. On the other hand, the development of ECCAIRS and Directive 
2003/42/EC on occurrence reporting in civil aviation [0] provides a firm basis for developing tools for collection 
and analysis of data. From this basis ASCOS will develop tools for integration and analysis of flight and 
occurrence data at a European level to support continuous safety monitoring.  
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 Conclusions and recommendations 6
The main results documented in this paper are safety performance indicators valid for the system of 
organizations in aviation. These safety performance indicators are important because they measure the proper 
functioning of the barriers that exist on the interfaces between organizations. 
 
Safety performance indicators are drafted for (1) the safety performance at interfaces between organisations, 
(2) the level of interaction, openness and sharing of information between different stakeholders, (3) the safety 
performance of an air transport system throughout its lifecycle, and (4) the level of harmonization in the 
approach to safety performance management activities at different organisations. 
 
The main goal of aviation safety performance indicators is to provide an indication of the probability of an 
accident. This can be done using lagging and leading indicators. The total set of indicators should remain 
manageable. Each individual indicator should match the following criteria: 
 
• Quantifiable and permitting statistical inferential procedures 
• Valid or representative to what is to be measured 
• Provide minimum variability when measuring the same conditions 
• Sensitive to change in environmental; or behavioural conditions 
• Cost of obtaining and using measures is consistent with the benefits 
• Comprehended by those in charge with the responsibility of using them 
 
The suggested lagging safety performance indicators match these criteria. For leading indicators it needs to be 
validated that they are representative as measurement for accident risk. In general it can be said that it is not 
unreasonable to assume there is a positive relation between a correct functioning system of organisation and 
aviation safety. Effort is required to validate that positive relation. Some of the indicators suggested are 
Boolean; they are either true of false. Boolean indicators are straightforward to quantify, comprehendible and 
cost-efficient. To assure sensitivity to changes safety performance measurement must be done frequently 
increasing costs of obtaining the results; a proper balance needs to be found. It is recommended to determine 
if the SPI introduced in this paper comply with the European guidance material on safety Key Performance 
Indicators.  
 
A baseline risk picture can be obtained by expanding the safety performance indicators into a causal risk model 
that formally represents the causal and statistical associations between the safety performance indicators and 
accident probabilities for various accident scenarios. The system of safety performance indicators and the 
causal risk model only provide a snapshot view of safety. In order to be useful in support of continued 
operational safety there must also be a process for continuous safety monitoring.  
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